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Borders of order? Borders of disorder?  
 
Between the State and the Citizen 
 
Elspeth Guild* 
 
My understanding of the concepts of belonging and foreignness and their reflection in 
law have been formed and guided by the deeply human analysis of Kees Groenendijk. 
His constant questioning of the justifications for differential treatment of individuals has 
provided me with the example for my own work. This investigation into the struggle 
of one man for the protection which citizenship offers is my way of thanking Kees for 
his tremendous generosity and academic leadership over so many years. I look forward 
to continuing to collaborate with him for many years to come. 
Introduction 
The modern state world depends on hard borders of sovereignty which include strict 
rules on the acquisition of citizenship so the state can determine for whom it is respon-
sible and territorial borders which establish the territory within which the state is re-
sponsible for the treatment of persons. This system of sovereignty is presided over by a 
bureaucracy which together with the territory and people form the Weberian defini-
tion of the state.1 The agency of the individual in this system of determination of iden-
tity and place is excluded as far as possible by European states. As the rules on acquisi-
tion of citizenship have changed in most EU Member States over the five year period 
2002 – 2007, the direction of the changes has been almost without exception to make 
it more difficult for the individual to determine or choose his or her citizenship.  
The concerns regarding political violence in Europe – commonly called the anti-
terrorism measures – have found expression on the issue of the individual as foreigner 
and the individual as citizen. The state’s control over the identity of the individual in 
the form of citizenship has become increasingly linked with the question of political 
violence – the obligation of the individual to be loyal to the state as part of the citizen-
ship package has rise to the fore after a long period of dormancy after WWII. 
The relationship of identity, citizenship and political violence has been the centre of 
a legal debate taking place among courts in a number of jurisdictions including in the 
UK. In order to understand better the meaning of the relationship I will examine the 
case of David Hicks an Australian national who was accused (and pleaded guilty before 
a military tribunal in the US detention camp in Guantanamo Bay) of being the “Aus-
tralian Taliban”.  
                                                  
*  Professor of European Immigration Law, Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nij-
megen, and partner at the law firm Kingsley Napley, London. 
1  M. Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans A. M Henderson & T. Parsons, 
Free Press: New York 1964, p. 154. 
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The Strange Case of David Hicks 
David Hicks was detained from 11 January 2002 until 30 May 2007 at the US deten-
tion centre in Guantanamo Bay.2 The centre was established hastily at the end of 2001 
as a place where the US military could send suspected Al Qaeda/Taliban members or 
sympathizers for indeterminate periods and without charge or trial.3 Many countries 
made representations to the US authorities for the release of their citizens. By mid 2005 
the UK had succeeded in obtaining the release of all the UK nationals at the detention 
centre and they were free in the UK. David Hicks was, however, still there in 2007 
although an agreement had finally been reached between the US and Australian au-
thorities for his return to Australia to serve a prison sentence there. 
David Hicks was born an Australian citizen on 7 August 1975. His mother was a 
British citizen who had been born in the UK. Had Hicks been born after 1 January 
1983 or had his father been a British citizen (born in the UK), then he would have 
been born a British citizen. Had he been a British citizen then it would have fallen to 
the UK authorities to seek his release from the Guantanamo Bay detention centre.  
The detention centre at Guantanamo Bay caused substantial problems for the US 
authorities. The then US Defense Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld who was responsible for 
the establishment of the centre did so to create a place where persons suspected of be-
ing supporters of the Taliban regime which ruled Afghanistan until ousted by a US led 
but UN sanctioned military intervention in October 2001 could be placed. The US 
authorities believed that the Taliban regime supported Al Qaeda which it held respon-
sible for the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York, the Pentagon in Wash-
ington and the crash of a plane in Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001.4 Rumsfeld 
stated that these persons would not be viewed in legal terms as prisoners of war but as 
unlawful combatants and as such “they do not have any rights under the Geneva Con-
ventions” [which regulate the position of foreign soldiers held by an enemy army].5 
The way in which individuals found themselves in the detention centre appears to have 
been highly irregular according to the accounts of those who have been released and 
the US authorities themselves.6 The treatment which the detainees received both in 
their transport to the island based and while there have been characterised as torture.  
The detainees were originally held without the intention of bringing them to trial. 
Under pressure the US authorities established a military tribunal to try at least some of 
them. Approximately 700 persons had passed through the detention centre by 2006, 
many were still there, including David Hicks. Fuller accounts of the Guantanamo Bay 
debacle can be found on the Human Rights Watch website and elsewhere.7 What is of 
interest here is what happens to the relationship of responsibility between the state and 
its citizens in such cases. As mentioned above, because the US authorities refused to 
                                                  
2  Aljazeera.net, May 30, 2007. 
3  Rose, D., Guantanamo, London: Faber and Faber 2004.  
4  Brouwer, E., Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism. A Changing Dynamic in European Law, Reeks 
Recht & Samenleving 19, Nijmegen: GNI 2003. 
5  Rose, supra, p. 3. 
6  M. Begg, Enemy Combatant, A British Muslim’s Journey to Guantanamo and back, London: The Free 
Press/Simon and Shuster 2006. 
7  BBC News 10 October 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/americas/3179858.stm. 
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categorized the detainees as prisoners of war, they were able to reject the application of 
international law rules on the treatment of prisoners of war – contained in the 1949 
Geneva Conventions. While there was much contention about the legal validity of this 
decision no court with the power to force the US authorities to act has yet done so.  
Whose Law Applies? What authority must provide protection? 
If international law does not protect persons in this position and the national authorities 
which are holding the individual do not provide any remedy, where can the individual 
look for relief? Citizenship comes into the picture here – the duty of the state to protect 
its citizens against abuse at the hands of foreign governments which is the counter part 
of the citizen’s duty of allegiance. David Hicks sought, through his lawyers, the inter-
vention of the Australian authorities. They refused against which refusal David Hicks 
brought legal proceedings in Australia to force his government to seek his return to 
Australia and out of what the UK’s highest court, the House of Lords, had described as 
a “legal black hole”.8  
On 8 March 2007 the Federal Court of Australia found that David Hicks’ claim that 
the Australian government owed him some duty (though exactly what duty is not yet 
clear) was accepted in so far as the judge ordered that the matter proceed to full trial.9 
According to the decision, the Australian authorities while acknowledging that David 
Hicks is an Australian national declined making any request to the US authorities for his 
repatriation. The reasons for this refusal was, according to Hicks’ statement of claim, 
“because Mr Hicks had committed no offence against any law of the Commonwealth 
[of Australia] or of any of the States or Territories, or against or under the common law 
in the Commonwealth, and because no Australian Court would have jurisdiction to try 
Mr Hicks for any criminal offence for which he may be punished in accordance with 
any such law” (para 23). In other words, the Australian authorities accepted or were 
unwilling to challenge the argument of the US authorities that Mr Hicks was a terrorist 
threat and could be held indefinitely without trial in the Guantanamo Bay detention 
centre. 
Loyalty, Protection and the Individual – the UK courts and David Hicks 
Mr Hicks sought to register as a British citizen in October 2005 under the UK law 
which permits the children of British mothers who had not been able to acquire citi-
zenship from them because of discrimination on the basis of gender in British national-
ity law before 1983. As the application is one which does not involve discretion by the 
state – that is to say so long as the individual fulfils the objective criteria he or she is 
entitled to register as a British citizen, the UK authorities decided that they must accept 
the application but:  
 
                                                  
8  Abbasi v Secretary of State [2002] EWCA Civ 1598. 
9  Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299 (8 March 2007). 
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“The Secretary of State proposes to proceed as follows. He is considering acceding 
to the application for British citizenship but at the same time making an order for 
the deprivation of citizenship under section 40 of the British Nationality Act on the 
grounds that your client has done things seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of 
the UK. Having taken legal advice, it appears to the Secretary of State that this is the 
proper method under the legislation to balance the competing interests in this case, 
and it means that your client would have the procedural protection of being able to 
appeal to the Special Immigration Appeals Commission in respect of any decision 
that he should be deprived of citizenship” (para 3).10 
 
Mr Hicks sought judicial review of the decision of the UK authorities on the basis that 
it was illegal. The UK court accepted that the only reason Mr Hicks sought British 
citizenship was because he considered that he had a better chance of being released 
from Guantanamo Bay detention if he were a British citizen. The judge noted that the 
UK authorities had, by April 2006, successfully negotiated the release of all British na-
tionals at the centre – effectively indicating that Mr Hicks was correct in his supposition 
that the UK authorities were more solicitous of the freedom of their nationals than 
their Australian counterparts. The case turned on the legal measures on the basis of 
which an individual can be deprived of British citizenship – what are the legitimate 
grounds and what are illegitimate. The same law which permitted Mr Hicks to register 
as a British citizen also permitted the UK authorities to deprive any British citizen of 
their citizenship (however acquired) on the grounds that “the Secretary of State is satis-
fied that the person has done anything seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of: (a) 
the United Kingdom, or (b) a British overseas territory.” 11  
The UK court found against the authorities on the ground that anything which an 
individual did before he or she became British could not justify deprivation of citizen-
ship after the individual acquired it. Only acts undertaken after an individual acquired 
citizenship could warrant deprivation. In order to reach that decision the court had to 
consider the basis on which the state can withdraw citizenship. At the heart of the ar-
gument is the concept of disloyalty and disaffection. In a decision shortly after WWII 
the UK courts had upheld the principle that a non-citizen can be guilty of disloyalty 
and hence treason in a judgment which has been much criticized.12 However, in this 
case the court held that the defendant by holding and using a British passport asserted 
and maintained a claim to continued protection of the Crown and thereby pledged the 
continuance of his fidelity. The principle is one of reciprocal duties – on the one hand 
the pledge of fidelity by the individual on the other protection by the state. In the case 
of Hicks, the UK authorities did not seek to argue that David Hicks had done anything 
which constituted disloyalty. Instead they argued that the second historical legal ground 
for withdrawal of citizenship applied – disaffection. The court defined disaffection as 
wider than disloyalty. It occurs  
 
                                                  
10  R v SSHD ex p Hicks.  
11  s20 British Nationality Act 1948; s40 British Nationality Act 1981 as amended by the Nationality, 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. 
12  Joyce v DPP [1946] AC 347. 
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“when an individual has by word or deed displayed active hostility to Her Majesty 
(as representing the United Kingdom) by showing himself unfriendly to the Gov-
ernment of the United Kingdom or hostile to its vital interests”.13  
 
The court rejected the UK authorities’ argument that there could be a duty in citizen-
ship to refrain from disloyalty or disaffection which predates the reciprocal duty of the 
state to protection of the citizen. The judge giving the lead opinion stated baldly  
 
“What none of these propositions establish [i.e. the arguments of the UK authorities] 
or come close to establishing, is that conduct of an Australian in Afghanistan in 2000 
and 2001 is capable of constituting disloyalty or disaffection towards the United 
Kingdom, a state of which he was not a citizen, to which he owes no duty and 
upon wich he made no claims” (para 37). 
 
UK higher courts are composed of more than one judge and each judge is entitled to 
write an opinion as part of the decision. In the Court of Appeal judgment on David 
Hicks, all three judges agreed on the outcome but one judge added a further considera-
tion. The other British detainees at the Guantanamo Bay detention centre were also 
dual nationals holding citizenship of a country other than the UK as well as that of the 
UK. The judge notes that the UK authorities at no time sought to withdraw their 
British citizenship from them. The lawyers for David Hicks argued that seeking to 
deprive David Hicks of British citizenship constituted discrimination. The UK authori-
ties argued that they have a discretion which they are entitled to exercise on this point 
(ie whether to seek to withdraw citizenship or not) and that in the exercise of that 
discretion the Secretary of State is entitled to take into account the extent of the links, 
including family links, which those British citizens have with the UK. Further, as David 
Hicks is an Australian citizen he is entitled to the protection of the Australian govern-
ment. His links with the UK were weak according to the UK authorities. Indeed, the 
UK authorities argued that the other British citizens who had been held in Guan-
tanamo Bay had held that citizenship before they were captured and taken there. The 
second judge in the UK court approved of this argument confirming his opinion that 
the UK authorities were entitled to distinguish between David Hicks and the other 
British citizens and to provide them with a higher level of protection. The only basis 
for this difference of treatment is the way in which and the time when David Hicks 
obtained British citizenship.  
This leads to the conclusion that the UK authorities are entitled to a discretion to 
provide greater or lesser protection to British citizens abroad depending on how they 
acquired their citizenship and when. However, it seems clear that the judge’s reasoning 
was much influenced by the fact that David Hicks holds also Australian citizenship and 
that on account of his family and social links that country ought to take responsibility 
for him not the UK. 
                                                  
13  Para 24. 
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Sovereignty, the State and David Hicks in the Australian Court 
David Hicks was captured by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in November 2001 
while he was at a taxi stand and he was handed over to the US authorities in December 
2001 on the basis that he was a supporter of the former Taliban regime there. When he 
was detained there was an armed conflict between the Northern Alliance and other 
groups against the Taliban which had been in power in the country. US forces were 
participating in the conflict on the side of the Northern Alliance. He states that he took 
no part in this conflict. He was taken to the Guantanamo Bay detention centre by the 
US authorities around 11 January 2002. As the judge pointed out in his judgment the 
US authorities  
 
“have never announced any intention to try Mr Hicks in relation to any offence 
against United States municipal law, or with any offence allegedly committed by 
him within the territory of the United States or within the jurisdiction of any of the 
civil courts of the United States” (para 8).  
 
The US authorities stated that David Hicks committed a belligerent act for the Taliban 
in the Afghan conflict but pressed no charges against him until 2007. David Hicks’ case 
was caught up in the US Supreme Court decisions on the lawfulness of the Military 
Commissions constituted to try persons detained in Guantanamo Bay, but this part of 
the history is beyond the remit of this article.14 
The Australian authorities which endorsed the US led intervention in Afghanistan 
and later participated as well in the US led invasion of Iraq refused publicly to request 
David Hicks return to Australia. David Hicks family and friends began a substantial 
campaign to seek to persuade the Australian authorities to protect David but there was 
great resistance for a substantial period of time. A movie was made and commercially 
released on the plight of David Hicks – Hicks v Bush – which provided substantial in-
formation about the life of David Hicks and his activities in Afghanistan.  
David Hicks brought a challenge in the Australian High Court demanding that the 
Australian authorities seek his return to Australia. He claimed that his wrongful intern-
ment was the responsibility of the Australian authorities, not only the US ones. Various 
Australian authorities had made statements to the effect that the Australian government 
would not seek the return of David Hicks because if he were brought back to Australia 
he may not be able to be prosecuted under Australian law (which begs the question 
whether he has committed any crime under Australian law and if the answer is negative 
why should he be convicted of anything in that country?). Secondly, the Australian 
authorities had confirmed that they have encouraged the US authorities to charge and 
try David Hicks even though the rules and standards of those trials before the Military 
Commissions which apply to those persons detained in Guantanamo Bay do not con-
form to international law fair trial standards to which the US is bound and have been 
repeatedly struck down for fair trial shortcomings by the US Supreme Court. 
The Australian authorities obtained a judgment at first instance that the proceeding 
should be stopped because there was no reasonable prospect of success. This decision 
                                                  
14  See Hamdan v Rumsfeld, 126 US 2749 (2006). 
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was overturned on appeal and it is that appeal judgment decision which is of interest 
here as it reveals the tensions in the relationship of sovereignty, the state, the individual 
and the role of the courts in that tension.15 
The Australian authorities made two main arguments on why the court should not 
determine the matter. First, it stated that to consider that matter would require the 
Australian court to pass judgment on the legality of acts of a foreign sovereign govern-
ment, something which under the doctrine of Act of State courts must refrain from 
doing. Secondly the Australian authorities argued that the issue impacts on or relates to 
foreign relations and gives rise to non-justiciable questions such that there is no matter 
on which the court can or should adjudicate – in other words, the affair is one of for-
eign relations and negotiation not court justice.  
David Hicks’ lawyers argued that Hicks was subject to unlawful detention by a for-
eign power which had no intention of bringing him before a lawfully constituted court 
on lawful criminal charges. Further, the Australian authorities have been aware of this 
since his arrival in Guantanamo Bay in 2002 but have done nothing to seek his return 
from this unlawful captivity. He argued that Australia owes a duty of protection to him 
or has a function to protect as an Australian citizen overseas. He accepted that the Aus-
tralian authorities have a discretion with respect to the state’s protective duty. However, 
the exercise of that discretion is subject to the law and to review by the Australian 
courts.  
The judge disagreed with the Australian authorities about how and where the obli-
gations owed by the state to a citizen abroad are to be determined. Notwithstanding 
the issues of negotiations among states, he found that the court was entitled to hear 
evidence and review the situation of David Hicks and the arguments of the authorities. 
He considered that neither the doctrine of Act of State nor the principle of non-
justiciability were sufficient to justify rejecting the claim of David Hicks at that point in 
the proceedings. Thus he did not rule out the possibility that at some future point in 
proceedings the Australian authorities might succeed in such an argument. Further, the 
judge found that David Hicks’ claim to the Australian state protection against unlawful 
detention was justified. While the Australian authorities argued that as they had no 
control over the detention of David Hicks they should be under no duty as regards that 
detention. The judge was not persuaded – noting that the UK had succeeded in repa-
triating its citizens from Guantanamo Bay.  
On the question of the right of an Australian judge to find the acts of foreign gov-
ernments illegal, the judge was persuaded that as deprivation of liberty is by definition 
unlawful until it is rebutted by evidence of lawful authority it must be accepted in law 
that David Hicks detention is unlawful (para 53). As to the discretion of the Australian 
authorities regarding how and in what way they protect their citizens abroad, the judge 
found that the exercise of that discretion was subject to judicial control. In particular, 
where there is evidence that the exercise of the discretion has been tainted by irrelevant 
considerations such as whether the individual could be tried in Australia, it is for the 
judge to determine what is relevant and what is not. Further, the fact that the Australian 
authorities were encouraging their US counterparts to try David Hicks under a proce-
dure which offends against the rules of fair trial both in Australia and internationally and 
                                                  
15  Hicks v Ruddock [2007] FCA 299. 
ELSPETH GUILD 
338 
fails to comply with the Geneva Conventions is not a consideration which should de-
termine the exercise of the discretion of the authorities on how to protect the citizen. 
While the judge accepted that the duty of the Australian authorities to protect their 
citizens abroad is not one on which an individual can rely in a court, nonetheless this 
does not mean that the duty has no legal consequences (para 65). It is the scope of this 
legal consequence for the state which is subject to judicial control. 
Conclusions 
When the citizen is abroad, in the international community he or she remains attached 
to his or her state through the duty of protection which is part of citizenship rights and 
practices. The activities of the individual may disrupt international relations, for instance 
when individuals engage in political violence on the territory of a state other than that 
of their nationality. The extent to which the state is obliged to provide protection to 
their citizens often then becomes contested. If interstate relations depend on the indi-
vidual citizen’s interest in protection being subordinated to the claim of a foreign state 
to act in a certain way towards the individual, what protection exists for the individual? 
To examine this problem I have taken the example of three states which strong sover-
eignty claims, the USA, Australia and the UK. I have followed the movement of one 
individual through the authority of these three states on the basis of citizenship claims. 
The US authorities claim to treat David Hicks in a certain way (ie indefinite detention) 
is based on his status as a foreigner. The US authorities have accepted that they have no 
such right to hold US citizens indefinitely in Guantanamo Bay. The UK authorities 
sought to avoid responsibility for David Hicks by depriving him of citizenship. By so 
doing they would then have no obligation to set about trying to convince the US au-
thorities to release him. The Australian authorities placed the interests of interstate rela-
tions with the USA above their duty to protect their citizen, effectively subordinating 
his position to the wider Australian interests in good relations with a powerful ally. 
In this case, the claim of David Hicks to liberty based on citizenship was rejected by 
the two states which were liable under the principle of reciprocity of rights and duties 
of citizenship. In both cases David Hicks turned to the courts to determine whether the 
state’s lack of protection to him was lawful. In the UK case, the court thwarted the 
state’s claim to be entitled to deprive David Hicks of citizenship but left open the door 
that even with British citizenship the UK authorities were entitled not to protect him 
in the same way that they would be required to protection British citizens who had 
been born as such and had strong links with the UK. In the Australian case, the judge 
held that the claim of sovereignty by the Australian authorities could not survive the 
claim of the citizen to protection. The state was answerable to the courts for the way in 
which it protects the citizen abroad, even where this may result in discomfort in inter-
national relations. 
 
